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Munro: The Conflicts of "Wasting" or "Cannibalizing" Insurance Policies

DEFENSE WITHIN LIMITS: THE CONFLICTS OF
"WASTING" OR "CANNIBALIZING" INSURANCE
POLICIES
Gregory S. Munro*

"What all this means is that one way or another, the consumer is
going to pay for the losses and expenses incurred by insurance
institutions in standing by and behind professional conduct."1
I. INTRODUCTION

This article deals with casualty insurance policies that
include expenses of defense in the limit of liability which is
normally available to indemnify against losses. The article will
discuss the reasons for development of such policy provisions
and the conflicts engendered by them for insureds, claimants'
lawyers and defense counsel. The author asserts that the real
problem with Defense Within Limits ("DWL") policies is not that
they attempt to contain defense expenditures, but that conflicts
result when the policy gives the insurer the potential ability to
completely deplete the available indemnity limit coupled with
the insurer's right to exercise sole discretion in settling,
defending and selecting counsel. The article will analyze
alternative legal solutions to the problems created by DWL
policies and will make recommendations for resolving the issues
raised by the policies.
II. DEFINITION OF DEFENSE WITHIN LIMITS
The bulk of casualty insurance policies are not defense
within limits policies. Auto insurance policies, as well as
homeowners and commercial general liability policies, provide
for defense expenditures in addition to the limits of liability.
*

Professor, University of Montana School of Law.

Questions or comments

should be directed to Professor Munro at University of Montana School of Law, Missoula,
Montana 59812 or by e-mail at Munro@selway.umt.edu.
1. LAWRENCE I. ZUTZ, Expenses: Inside or Outside Policy Limits - The
Lawyer/Broker, Speech Before the American Bar Association National Malpractice
Conference (Spring 1991).
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However, in such areas of casualty coverage as professional
liability and directors' and officers' liability, the policies tend to
contain provisions that clearly place them in the "defense within
limits" category. Sometimes, as will be seen later in this article,
whether the policy is a "defense within limits" policy is at issue.
For purposes of this article, it is necessary to clarify what this
author means by the "standard" liability policy as opposed to
that defined as "defense within limits."
A. The "Standard"or Non-DWL Policy
Under most liability insurance policies, the insurance
carrier has the twin duties of providing defense of the claim and
indemnifying the insured against liability.2 The basic insuring
agreement of the standard liability policy will contain some
variation of the insurer's promise to indemnify, that is, to pay
damages arising out of the insured's liability. 3 The agreement
will then provide for defense of any "suit" against the insured for
damages covered by the insurance. 4 The language setting out
the duty to defend is generally followed by the qualification that
"the Company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or
judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
Company's liability has been exhausted by payment of
5
judgments or settlements."
Such casualty policies invariably contain a limit of liability
clause that limits the amount of money the carrier will pay out
under the promise to indemnify. 6 However, there is no such
2. However, Directors' and Officers' "liability" insurance is actually indemnity
insurance under which there is no duty to defend. The insured must defend, pay for
defense and then seek reimbursement from the insurer. David S. Borden et al., Directors
and Officers Liability Insurance Deskbook, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. TORT AND INSURANCE
PRACTICE SECTION, 293.

3. "We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies."
1 Susan J. Miller & Philip Lefebvre, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES
ANNOTATED, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form CG 00 01 10 93, form CGGL1,
provision lAla at 409 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter MILLER'S].
4. See, e.g. id. "We will have the right and duty to defend any 'suit' seeking those
damages. We may at our discretion investigate any 'occurrence' and settle any claim or
'suit' that may result."
5. MILLER'S, supra note 3, at 453.8.
6. Id. Provision 31 at 415 provides as follows:
1. The Limits of Insurance shown in the Declarations and the rules below
fix the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
a. Insureds:
b. Claims made or "suits" brought; or
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limit on the amount of money the carrier promises to expend on
defense of the insured under the conventional policy. The costs
of defense are not included in the limit of liability, which only
applies to the insurer's obligation to indemnify, so the carrier's
promise to defend is essentially unlimited. For purposes of this
article, this author will refer only to policies in which the limit of
liability applies only to losses and not defense expenses as
"standard" policies.
B. The Defense Within Limits (DWL) Policy
A policy in which the limit of liability available for paying
losses is reduced by the costs of defense is called a "defense
(DWL) policy. Such a policy is also known as a
within limits"
"wasting,"7
"cannibalizing," "self-consuming"8
or "self
9 policy because its available indemnity limit may be
liquidating"
eaten or "wasted" by the costs of defense. 10 Such DWL policies
have been used for Directors' and Officers' ("D & 0") liability for
some time." Some of the D & 0 policies actually contain no
2
duty to defend and leave defense costs entirely to the insured.

III. THE DWL POLICY PROVISIONS
It is helpful here to set out the provisions that generally
distinguish a DWL policy from a policy with no limit on the duty
to defend. While some policies require a tortured interpretation
c. Persons or organizations making claims or bringing "suits"
2. The General Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay for the sum of:
a. Medical expenses under Coverage C;
b. Damages under coverage A, except damages because of "bodily
injury" and "property damage" included in the "products-completed
operations hazard"; and
c. Damages under Coverage B.
7. Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 298 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
8. Id. at 879.
9. Jeffrey A. Tidus, Self-Liquidating Policy Limits: Benefits and Risks to
Lawyers. Address at the A.B.A. National Legal Malpractice Conference (Spring 1996).
10. The author will refer to inclusion of defense costs within the limits of liability
as "defense within limits" or "DWL" because that phrase is most descriptive of the
provision. Whether the provision wastes, cannibalizes or liquidates the indemnity limits
may depend on whether defense costs or indemnity is given priority in exhausting the
limits of liability.
11. Borden, et al., supra note 2, and the cases collected therein.
12. Julie J. Bisceglia, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance - Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 690, 691 (1985).
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to glean their implicit DWL provisions, 13 others have been
recognized as explicit DWL contracts. 14 Insurance Services
Organization, Inc. (hereinafter "I.S.O."), the trade organization
for the casualty insurance industry, drafts policy forms for the
industry. The I.S.O. has drafted explicit DWL provisions which
merit consideration here.
The I.S.O. DWL policy form generally features three
5
modifications from the standard I.S.O. form casualty policy.'
First, the standard insuring agreement traditionally provides
that the company's obligation to pay or defend terminates when
the limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by
payment of judgment or settlement. Under the standard (nonDWL) form, the insurer faced with a claim that exceeds limits
cannot simply tender the limits and withdraw from the defense.
The insurer must defend until the case is settled on its merits or
a verdict is rendered so the limit can be expended on the
resulting judgment. Under the DWL policy, that provision is
modified-the liability limit may be exhausted, not only by
payment of judgments or settlements, but also by "claims
expenses.' 6 Second, the limit of liability clause is altered so
that the "aggregate" limit of the company's liability includes not
only damages, but also "claims expenses."1 7 The limit of liability
clause may also provide that "claims expenses" are subtracted
13. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co., 7 F.3d 93, 94 (7th
Cir. 1993) (where Judge Easterbrook said, "Imperial's interpretation of its policy appears
to be a recent discovery").
14. See, e.g., Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 298
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
15. Note that the property/casualty insurance industry trade association, the
I.S.O., drafts form policies for most types of casualty insurance. These forms and loss
experience data arising from their use are available to I.S.O. member insurance carriers
which will often adopt the forms either verbatim or with minor modifications. Hence,
the policies are somewhat uniform in their provisions. One should further note that
such a service is possible only because the industry is exempt from federal antitrust
legislation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2001).
16. See, e.g., MILLER'S, supra note 3, Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance
Form GL 00 23 03 81 (1981), provision 1C3, at 453.8 which provides:
The company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend
or continue to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the company's
liability has been exhausted by payment of judgment, settlements or CLAIMS
EXPENSES.

17. See, e.g., id., provision 4A2, at 453.8 stating:
Subject to the above provisions with respect to "aggregate", the total liability of
the company for all damages and CLAIMS EXPENSES arising out of the same or
related professional service shall not exceed the limit of liability stated in the
[declarations] as applicable to "all claims arising out of the same or related
professional services".
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from the limit of liability before indemnity, and the company has
the right to withdraw when the limits are exhausted.18 The
limit of liability clause may then provide for a "deductible" and
"reimbursement" in the event the insurer has indemnified or
paid defense expenses that exceed the limit of liability. 19 Third,
the policy will carry an additional definition for "claims
20
expenses" so the term will cover all legal defense costs.
As one might imagine, there may be some variation in the
way insurers approach DWL. For example, in the area of legal
malpractice, the American Bar Association ("ABA") reports that
38 of the 48 insurers providing legal malpractice coverage
include defense costs within the limits of liability in their
policies. 21 Approximately 13 of the companies with DWL
provisions allow exceptions by endorsement, 22 which likely
involves increased premium. Some companies include defense
costs in limits after a certain defense allowance.
18. See, e.g., id., provision 4A3, at 453.8, stating:
All CLAIM EXPENSES shall first be subtracted from the limits of liability, with
the remainder, if any, being the amount available to pay as damages. If the
limits of liability hereunder are exhausted prior to settlement or judgment of
any pending claim or SUIT, the company shall have the right to withdraw from
the further investigation or defense thereof by tendering control of such
investigation or defense to the INSURED.
19. See, e.g., id., provision 4A4, at 453.8, which provides:
Deductible. The company's obligation to pay damages and CLAIMS EXPENSES
resulting from claims arising out of the same or related professional services
applies only to the amount of damages and CLAIMS EXPENSES in excess of any
deductible amount, if any, stated in the [declarations].
See also id., provision 4A5, at 453.8.
Reimbursement of the Company. If the company has paid any amounts in
settlement or satisfaction of claims or judgments or for CLAIMS EXPENSES in
excess of the applicable limit of liability, or within the amount of the applicable
deductible, the INSUREDS, jointly and severally, shall be liable to the company
for any and all such amounts and, upon demand, shall pay such amounts to the
company.
20. See, e.g., id., provision 6A, at 453.9, which provides:
"[CILAIMS EXPENSES" means (1) fees charged by an attorney or arbitrator
designated by the company, and (2) all other fees, costs and expenses resulting
from the investigation, adjustment, defense of a claim, arbitration or SUIT,
arising in connection therewith if incurred by the company, but "CLAIMS
EXPENSES" does not include Supplementary Payments, salary charges of
regular employees or officials of the company or fees and expenses of
independent adjusters.
See also id., provision 6B, at 453.9, providing:
"[SluIT" includes an arbitration proceeding to which the INSURED is required to
submit or to which the INSURED has submitted with the company's consent.
21. See chart included in Selecting Legal Malpractice Insurance, American Bar
Association, Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, 2001 Ed.
22. Id.
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For example, Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company of
California provides DWL after a $50,000 annual defense
allowance on policies with maximum liability limits of $5 million
per claim and $7 million aggregate. The Oklahoma Attorneys
Mutual Insurance Company policy is DWL after a claims
expense allowance of the lesser of $100,000 or 50% of the per
claim limit on maximum limits of $10 million each claim.
Florida
Lawyers
Mutual
Insurance
Company makes
supplemental defense coverage available in the amount of 25%
of the per claim limit with a $1,000,000 maximum on liability
23
limits of $20 million each claim.
Overall, it appears that approximately 22 of the 48
companies offering legal malpractice insurance allow some form
of option for defense costs outside the limits of liability,
presumably for a higher premium. St. Paul Fire & Marine offers
three options: DWL, DWL with supplemental defense expense
coverage equal to the limit of liability, and defense outside limits
with no limit of liability ("standard" coverage). Looking at the
three companies mentioned above that have a defense cost
allowance in their DWL policy, one can see that $50,000 and
$100,000 defense cost allowances on multi-million dollar liability
limits really mean that the entire cost of any substantial defense
will be subtracted from the liability limit. The insured will need
the sophistication to recognize this change and increase limits
accordingly.
Regardless of options which result in higher
premiums, it is clear that the DWL policy is the rule and not the
exception in legal malpractice policies.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DWL POLICY PROVISIONS
DWL policy provisions appear in policies covering liabilities
that might be considered high risk. Thus, they appear in
medical malpractice policies, legal malpractice policies, directors
and officer's liability policies and in some manuscript
commercial general liability policies. The complexity of cases in
those areas, as well as the amount of dollars at issue, makes the
cases hard fought and the defense costs substantial. Because
this article's premise is that DWL provisions raise many legal
issues and conflicts about the defense of these high risk cases
under the policies, it will be instructive to first consider the
history of the provisions and the reasons the insurers developed

23.

Id.
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them in the different liability policies.
A. History of DWL Policy Provisions
1. Medical and Legal MalpracticePolicies
The DWL policy is not entirely new. In the 1970s the
insurance industry wanted more predictability in the face of
medical malpractice claims which were increasing in number
Hence, the industry included "allocated loss
and size.
adjustment expenses" in the liability limits of medical
Ironically, DWL was not
malpractice insurance policies. 24
until the 1980s because no
coverage
malpractice
adopted in legal
similar increase in legal malpractice claims occurred in the
1970s, 25 and the low loss activity in legal claims resulted in low
premiums. 26 When legal malpractice claims increased in the
1980s, the industry also introduced DWL into legal malpractice
insurance. At that time, the focus of concern among lawyers
was the change from "occurrence" to "claims-made"27 policies,
and the fact that DWL provisions also appeared in those
policies 28 received little attention.
2. Directors'and Officers' Liability Policies
D & 0 policies for corporate boards became common during
the 1980s in response to the rise in litigation involving those
boards. By 1982, a corporate survey regarding D & 0 liability
showed an average total cost of $1,340,000 per claim of which an
average $763,000 accounted for claim settlement or judgment
and $577,000 for legal fees. 29 The same survey showed suits by

24. Jane C. Taylor, Expenses Within Limit: A Reinsurer's Prospective. Address at
the American Bar Association National Legal Malpractice Conference (Spring 1991).
25. Id.
26. Id. One writer notes that in the competitive market of the late 1970s, insurers
offered policies that provided expenses in addition to the limit of liability and deductibles
that only applied to loss just as the frequency and severity of claims increased. Carriers
left the market and imposed DWL on their return. ZUTZ, supra note 1.
27. "Occurrence" policies covered the accident or injury that occurred during the
policy term, even if the claim was not made until the policy expired. This meant claims
could be made on the policy so long as the statute of limitations had not expired. The
industry became adverse to the "long-tail" risk involved and switched its insureds to
"claims made" policies which provided coverage only for those accidents for which a claim
was made during the policy period.
28. ZUTZ, supra note 1.
29. The Wyatt Company, 1982 Comprehensive Report: Directors & Officers
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stockholders to be the single largest source of the claims,
followed by employee and customer suits.30 The same thing
happened in the legal malpractice insurance arena where it has
been said that "their [insurers] exposure was nearly as great in
31
defending claims as it was in paying them."
Sitting alongside the expense ratio bottom lines were a few
horror stories in which carriers had expended tens or hundreds
of thousands of dollars for results, which both happily and
unhappily, produced little or no liability payments. Even more
disturbing were the increasing number of cases in which the
defendant "won" but the carrier spent more than policy limits in
32
producing the "victory."
It was because claims increased in frequency and size
combined with defense costs that seemed unpredictably large
which prompted the insurance industry to market D & 0
policies, which are relevant to our discussion by reason of three
peculiar characteristics. First, they generally do not provide for
any duty to defend. 33 However, they do include the insured's
defense costs on the definition of covered "loss" for indemnity
purposes. 34 The insured corporation or board member which is
sued must defend and seek reimbursement under the
indemnification language of the policy.
Second, D & 0 policies may be indemnity policies and not
liability policies. 35 Thus, the insurer may have no duty to pay a
judgment or verdict until the insured has paid it and sought
reimbursement under the policy's promise to indemnify. 36
Third, and most importantly for our inquiry, the policies are
DWL policies insofar as the defense costs will reduce the limit of
liability coverage available.
These characteristics probably
reflect the "unending controversy" that has developed between
insurers and insured directors and officers in deciding whether
to defend the variety of potential claims pressed against
corporate boards. 37 The carriers have simply avoided the issue
of whether to defend by letting the insured defend and seek
Liability/Fiduciary Liability 45 (1982), reportedin Bisceglia, supra note 12, at 694.
30. Id. reported in Bisceglia, supra note 12, at 693.
31. ZUTZ, supra note 1.
32. Id.
33. Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 298 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
34. Borden et al., supra note 2, at 93.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Bisceglia, supra note 12, at 707-08.
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reimbursement later.
Because D & 0 policies have been
covering corporate losses for at least two decades, we will see
that many of the pivotal decisions involving DWL arise from D
& 0 coverage.
3. Commercial General Liability Policies
In 1985, the Insurance Services Office, Inc. ("I.S.O."), the
trade organization for the casualty insurance industry,
developed a Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy that
featured defense within limits. 38 This was popular with the
insurers who were struggling under the impact of the mass toxic
tort cases and the many coverage issues the cases raised. Costs
of defense in that arena were also skyrocketing. However,
insurance consumers, marketing intermediaries and insurance
regulators opposed DWL in the CGL policies so that the I.S.O.
eventually withdrew the form. 39 Some states adopted rules
disallowing DWL or allowing such policies only on approval of
the state's insurance commissioner. 40 Nevertheless, DWL has
become commonplace in the professional liability errors and
omissions policies. 4 1 Also, the statutory prohibitions against
DWL generally do not apply to manuscript policies that are
written for large insureds, so DWL provisions commonly exist in
the CGL insurance covering many corporations.
B. Reasons for Development of the DWL Policy Provisions
1.

Perspectiveof the Primaryand Excess Insurers.

Insurers developed the DWL policy because of the
increasing and uncertain cost of defense. To see the problem,
one need only look at the defense costs involved in DWL cases
that are the subject of appellate court decisions. In Biomass One
v. Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Co. ,42 the policy contained a
$2 million liability limit and the defense fees and costs were $1.9

38. Shaun McParland Baldwin, Legal and Ethical Considerations for "Defense
Within Limits" Policies, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 89, 89 (1994).
39. Id.
40. See discussion infra, Part VII.
41. See, e.g. MILLER'S, supra note 3, Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance, GL
00230281, form PLLP2, provision 4A1, at 453.8.
42.
No. 91-35197, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17773, at *1 (9th Cir. July 20, 1992)
(reported as Table Case at 968 F.2d 1220, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23129).
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million. In Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corporation,43 the "per
loss" limit was $1 million and the costs of defense were in excess
of $1 million. In Helfand v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co.,44 the defense costs were $1.5 million on a $10 million policy.
Harnischfeger Corporation v. Harbor Insurance Co.,45 involved
an aggregate limit of $3 million and litigation expenses of
$1,230,141. Legal expenses exceeded the $2 million policy limit
in Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Insurance Co.46 In some of
these cases, attorneys' fees that rivaled or exceeded the liability
limit for indemnity gave rise to issues involving DWL.
Consequently, uncertainty about defense costs and their
mounting size has prompted insurers to limit that part of their
promise to the insured.
Primary insurers whose policies do not contain DWL
provisions have the problem of freeing themselves from the
unlimited duty to defend when potential damage claims will
clearly exhaust the liability limits of their primary coverage and
extend to the excess coverage. If the damage claim will clearly
exceed the primary insurer's limit of liability, but the case
cannot be settled because the excess carrier and claimant cannot
agree, the primary insurer with a limitless duty to defend may
expend defense fees far exceeding its liability limits.
In Bankers Trust,47 Imperial Casualty and Indemnity
Company had primary limits of $2 million. The company
incurred more than $2 million in legal expenses defending the
claim while the insured engaged in coverage litigation with the
excess insurer. When the claim exceeds the limit of the primary
insurer's liability, the primary insurer may find it is defending
for the benefit of the excess carrier and cannot escape because
the promise to defend under the basic insuring agreement is
nominally unlimited. In such cases, it inures to the benefit of
the primary carrier to have DWL provisions, so defense
expenses can serve to exhaust the limits of the primary carrier's
policy and trigger the obligations of the excess carrier.
The company providing excess coverage also has an interest
in issues of DWL. If the primary insurer can count its defense
costs toward exhausting its policy limits, it may be able to
exhaust quickly and trigger the excess carrier's coverage.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

823 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1987).
10 Cal. App. 4th 869, 881 (1992).
927 F.2d 974, 975 (7th Cir. 1991).
7 F.3d 93, 94 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id.
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Unless the primary policy has clear DWL provisions, the excess
carrier will argue that the primary policy cannot be exhausted
by defense costs so as to trigger the excess insurer's duties. In
Coleman Company, Inc. v. California Union Insurance Co.,48 the
insured had a primary policy which clearly included defense
costs in calculation of the limit of liability. Its excess insurer
provided $1.5 million insurance that was "follow form" to a $1
million primary policy provided by Commercial Union. The
excess policy provided that no obligation to defend was included
in the limit.
The question, then, was whether the defense costs could be
used by the insured and primary carrier in calculating the point
at which the excess coverage attached. The court noted that the
excess policy was "following form" and held that the intent was
to consider the underlying (DWL) policy in determining the
coverage under the umbrella policy. 49 Hence, the defense costs
of the primary insurer could be used to calculate the exhaustion
of limits that triggered the excess coverage.
In Harnischfeger, Harbor Insurance Company sold excess
insurance policies to Harnischfeger on the express condition that
the coverage "shall not attach unless and until [Harnischfeger or
its insurer] shall have paid the amount of the underlying limits
on account of such occurrence."50 The underlying limit agreed
upon was $3 million.
Harnischfeger insured under selfretention and contracted with Wassau to administer its
insurance fund and adjust claims with a $3 million limit on
Wassau's outlay in doing so. Harbor's excess policy had a "limit
of liability" clause that limited Harbor's liability to "Ultimate
Net Loss" and defined that loss to include "expenses for doctors,
lawyers, nurses and investigators and other persons, and for
litigation, settlement, adjustment and investigation of claims
51
and suits."
Harnischfeger claimed that the $3 million administrative
expense of Wassau counted to exhaust its self insured retention
and triggered Harbor's duties under the excess policy. The
excess carrier obtained a summary judgment which was
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court held that
Harbor had no duty to pay until Harnischfeger had expended $3
48. 960 F.2d 1529, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992).
49. Id. at 1534-35.
50. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 974 (7th Cir. 1991)
(alteration in original).
51. Id.
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million in indemnity, not defense costs, reasoning that the
Ultimate Net Loss language was part of the limit of liability
52
clause and not the loss payable clause.
On the other hand, if the primary policy provides DWL,
issues may arise as to whether the excess coverage is also DWL.
Insurance binders under which the excess carriers agree to
provide coverage do not always make a clear joining of
coverages. The insurance binder may use the words "follow
form" to indicate that the excess insurance follows the form of
the primary policy which is likely a derivative of a form
produced by the I.S.O. However, the insurance binders also
make free reference to I.S.O. forms as a simple method of
specifying the coverage. Hence, ambiguity may develop as to
whether the excess insurer is following form and covering under
DWL provisions or providing coverage under I.S.O. standard
forms.
In Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Pacific Employers Insurance
Co., 53 Pacific provided excess insurance in the amount of
$500,000 under an insurance binding agreement with Asplundh.
The insurance binding agreement provided that Asplundh had a
$500,000 annual self insured retention that included defense,
settlement and supplementary payments. In essence, Asplundh
self-insured as the primary carrier under a DWL policy. The
insurance binder provided that Pacific would provide "$500,000
aggregate excess of the limits described" 54 in Asplundh's
retention.
However, the excess insurance binder also
incorporated and referenced coverage under I.S.O. forms that
provided standard liability coverage, not DWL.
When Aslplundh suffered $874,288.83 in product liability
claims and defense expenses, it submitted the $374,288.83
excess over its $500,000 self-insured retention to PEIC under
the excess insurance binder. PEIC paid that amount (which
included defense costs) from its $500,000 limit (which it treated
as DWL), and then sent to excess insurer, National Union,
$125,711.17 contending that amount represented the balance of
its $500,000 obligation to defend and indemnify Asplundh.
National Union refused, contending that PEIC had to continue
defending claims against Asplundh, regardless of cost, until
PEIC's $500,000 limit was exhausted by indemnity claims not

52.
53.
54.

Id.
No. 90-6976, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19171, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1992).
Id. at *7.
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including defense costs.
Asplundh brought an action for bad faith for PEIC's failure
to continue paying defense costs under its promise, and PEIC
moved to dismiss on the ground that its coverage was "follow
form" to Asplundh's DWL provisions. The court found the
insurance binder ambiguous, noting that the interpretation of
Asplundh and National Union was a reasonable one and refused
to grant PEIC's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims that PEIC
had a continuing duty to defend.
Hence, excess carriers may litigate the issue of whether
defense costs can be counted towards exhausting the primary
carrier's limits, and triggering the excess carrier's duty to
perform.
On the other hand, reinsurers, those companies
insuring the primary insurers against claims too big in size and
number for the primary insurer to financially handle, favor
DWL provisions for several reasons: 55 First, insurers who carry
primary lines, such as legal and medical malpractice insurance,
are often captive companies who carry only one line of insurance
and cannot pull out of bad markets. Risk of losses from variance
of legal climate, cannot be spread among different lines and this
creates risk to the primary insurer and ultimately the
56
reinsurer.
Second, DWL "dampens volatility" of lines like legal
malpractice insurance making losses more predictable and the
reinsurer's pricing easier.5 7 Third, in an era in which expenses
of defense often exceed indemnity payments, the primary
insurer cannot rely on the reinsurer until the indemnity limits
of primary insurance are exhausted. While the reinsurers could
agree to respond when expenses reach a certain level, they
would rather have the expenses included in the indemnity limit
58
for better certainty and predictability.
Fourth, DWL may discourage insureds from relying on an
unlimited duty to defend and failing to purchase adequate
insurance. The theory is that such insureds will have to be more
realistic in assessing the necessary limits if they know that
59
defense expenses are deducted from the limit of indemnity.
Reinsurers want to avoid potential inadequate coverage for bad
faith or excess claims that may affect the reinsurer.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Taylor, supra note 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Fifth, DWL avoids the problem of the "fight at all costs"
approach that an insured may adopt if the insurer has an
unlimited duty to defend. 60 Finally, reinsurers view DWL as
increasing the security of the primary insurers who are their
clients by reducing their risk, increasing predictability and
thereby buttressing their financial condition, all of which inures
61
to the benefit of the reinsurers.
2. Perspective of the Insured
At first glance, it is hard to see how DWL policies benefit
insurance consumers. When the professional liability insurers
notified insureds of the change to claims-made policies in the
1980s, they also inserted DWL provisions. Hence, a nominally
unlimited duty to defend was changed to provide expenses of
defense only insofar as they fit in the limit of money available
for indemnity. It may be true that the nominally unlimited
policy was, in the arena of professional liability insurance, only
a recent creation, having been developed in a competitive soft
market in the late 1970s. 62 Nevertheless, adopting DWL in the
1980s resulted in what amounted to a significant reduction in
coverage for consumers, and it is doubtful that there was a
correlative decrease in rates. Insurers would argue that they
had to adopt DWL because expenses in defending claims were
rivaling losses paid. This is no doubt true considering the
complexity of defending, under professional malpractice policies
and D & 0 policies, huge claims arising out of such events as the
savings and loan failures and toxic spills.
However, one wonders whether the situation in which
defense costs equal or exceed loss payments is really anything
new. When the average loss was $10,000, it was likely that
average defense costs were also $10,000. It is equally likely that
the real problem is the size of the claims. When claims under
CGL policies were $10,000 or $100,000, insurers were probably
prepared for defense expenditures in equal amounts, but that
was not so when the limits and the claims were $1,000,000 or
more.
By the 1980s, the policy limits purchased for predicted
liability protection had simply grown to a size where the
insurers were unwilling to make an equal commitment for risk
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
ZUTZ, supra note 1.
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of defense expenditures. 63 The insurers want to limit their
exposure with some certainty. 64
Before DWL, the insured assessed likely risk exposure in
terms of predicted losses and contracted accordingly for
appropriate limits of liability. Sophisticated insureds may have
appreciated the fact that they were also purchasing the insurer's
duty to defend, though it is unlikely that they truly appreciated
the fact that the duty was virtually unlimited. The emergence of
DWL provisions meant that consumers of D & 0 coverage and of
professional liability coverage shouldered the dual burden of
evaluating the potential costs of defense, as well as potential
loss payable, in order to decide the appropriate limit of liability
for their casualty insurance. When the insurers adopted DWL,
they, in essence, transferred to the insureds the unlimited and
unpredictable risk involved in costs of defense.
Whether this involved any tangible benefit to the insured is
questionable. Industry asserts that the insured can obtain
significant savings by purchasing DWL policies. 6 5 However,
such assertions must be tested against the fact that the insured
must purchase higher indemnity limits to cover the amount
deducted for costs of defense. Given the experience of the
industry, an insured under professional liability or D & 0
coverage would be prudent in assuming that defense expenses
will equal losses payable, so that the net affect of a change to
DWL is the necessity of doubling one's liability limits. If law
firms, medical firms and corporate boards did not do so in the
1980s when DWL was adopted, it is likely because they were
focused on and concerned with the perceived impact of the forced
switch to claims-made policies and did not appreciate the import
or even the existence of DWL provisions in their policies. 66
Theoretically, if that part of the industry consisting of
captive and single-line insurers offering professional errors and

63. 36 of the 48 insurers providing legal malpractice insurance offer limits of at
least $10 million, one as much as $125 million per claim and $250 million aggregate. See
chart included as an appendix to, Selecting Legal Malpractice Insurance, Standing
Committee on Lawyer's Professional Liability.
64. Id. Thirty eight of the forty eight legal malpractice insurers include now
defense costs within their limits.
65. Michael Bradford & Linda Collins, I.S.O.'s Defense Cost Plan Meets Mounting
Criticism, Bus. INS., July 8, 1985, at 1, 29.
66. Surveys conducted by the author at Continuing Legal Education programs for
lawyers indicate that more than half do not know that their Errors & Omissions policies
are DWL, and consequently, have not taken expenses of defense into account in selecting
their limit of liability.
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omissions ("E & 0") coverage and D & 0 coverage were
prohibited from using DWL policies, they would have to greatly
increase premiums to cover the unpredictability of costs of
defense in the high limit policies of today or be forced to pull out
of the market. Hence, they argue, the insurance consumers will
either pay a greatly increased premium for the unfettered duty
to defend; pay a lesser premium for DWL (which means
purchasing a policy with higher limits and thereby incurring
additional premium expense); or face a market in which the
insurance is not available.
However, at least one actuary
asserts that there is no actuarial need for DWL provisions in
liability policies because actuarial rate making procedures allow
pricing of such policies at a profitable level without deducting
defense costs from the limit.67 Nevertheless, one way or the
other, the argument goes, "the consumer is going to pay for the
losses and expenses." 68 The real question is whether any
savings realized as a result of DWL policies are passed on to the
insurance consumer.
V. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

There are, inherent in DWL policies, marketing and
provision of benefits and potential legal problems, especially
conflicts of interest, that may ultimately make them risky for
insurers as well as insureds. There are the questions about
whether the insured knows the policy is defense within limits.
New issues about control of the defense arise under DWL
policies as well as issues of what triggers a duty to settle under
a policy whose limits can be liquidated by the defense costs.
DWL policies can present conflicts for the plaintiffs attorney
whose decision to aggressively represent the claimant may
exhaust the policy. They can present conflicts for insurance
defense counsel who intends to defend a risk averse client who
prefers to save the limit of liability for settlement. These are
conflicts and problems that present risks to the carriers, their
insureds and their respective counsel. Each potential problem
merits some discussion here.

67. Martin Rosenberg, Inclusion of Defense Costs in Policy Limits: An Analysis of
the Potentialfor Failureof a Policy Form, 8 J. INS. REG. 446, 447 (1990).
68. ZUTZ, supra note 1.
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A. Risk of Misrepresentationsin Marketing the DWL Policy
Because of the marked change in coverage between a policy
that provides an unrestricted duty to defend and a policy that
deducts the entire cost of defense from the liability limit, a
potential for intentional or negligent misrepresentation exists if
the insurance intermediaries doing the marketing are not
careful in representing limits of liability. Sales materials or
policy language indicating that a policy has "indemnity" limits of
a certain amount, when in fact the limit is subject to deduction
for expenses of defense would raise risk of misrepresentation.
Even stating limits of liability may involve the same risk absent
some language of notice in the policy that defense expenses are
deducted from the available limit.
The state of Oregon requires that the DWL policy form give
notice that defense costs are deducted from the limits available
for liability. 69 A policy containing representations about liability
limits and DWL provisions might be found to be ambiguous by
reason of conflicting provisions, or because the policy layout and
design misleads or allows the insured to have a reasonable
expectation that it contains a limit of liability unfettered by
defense expenses.70 In Branning v. CNA Insurance Co. 71 the
court found the insurer's purported DWL provisions ambiguous
because construing the policy to be DWL required juxtaposition
of "three different clauses appearing on different pages."72 The
court cited the fact "that a purchaser of insurance could
reasonably review this policy and not be aware that the insurer
73
sought to deduct defense costs from the limit of liability."
Hence, the doctrine of reasonable expectations may apply to
provide the insurance consumer indemnity coverage not subject
to reduction for defense expenditures.
B. Rights and Duties of the Parties Under the DWL Policy
The dynamics between insured and insurer change
substantially when
the
insured
seeks
defense
and
indemnification under a DWL policy. Under standard policies,
69.

OR. REV. STAT. § 742.063 (1999).

70. See, e.g., Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 365 A.2d 744, 746-47
(N.H. 1976) (where the court honored the consumer's reasonable expectations given the
form and layout of the policy).
71. 729 F. Supp. 728 (1989).
72. Id. at 732.
73. Id. at 733.
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defense of most claims does not involve a conflict between the
insured and the insurer.
Insurance defense counsel
traditionally advise the insurers they represent that counsel
owes his or her primary duty to the insured and give little
weight to costs of defense in determining the best course of
action in defending or settling the case. Indeed, insurers
attempts to control the defense and costs of defense have been
held to be the unauthorized practice of law. 74 Counsel zealously
defends the insured, does not consider the interests of the
insurer, and takes no actions adverse to the interests of the
insured. 75 When the occasional claim arises in which a conflict
exists between the insurer and the insured, defense counsel
recommends that the insurer retain separate counsel to
represent its interests or, in the case of many coverage disputes,
recommends the insurer issue a reservation of rights letter and
inform the insured that the insured may wish to seek the advice
of independent counsel.
As stated by Windt:
The first thing that an insurer with a duty to defend must
determine after receiving notice that a suit has been filed against
one of its insureds is whether there is a conflict of interest between
it and the insured with regard to how the lawsuit should be
defended. If there is no such conflict, the insurer can hire counsel
to represent both the insured's and the insurance company's
interests in the litigation. If, however, there is such a conflict, the
insurer should consider either hiring "independent" counsel to
represent76 the insured or allowing the insured to select private
counsel.

Under the DWL policy, there is an inherent conflict between

the insured and the insurer in every case where payment of loss
plus payment of defense costs could exceed the limits of liability,
since every dollar spent on defense of the claim is a dollar that
will not be available for settlement or satisfaction of judgment.
This is no problem as long as the insured and insurer are fully
agreed (and continue to agree) on the merits of settling versus
defending including issues of timing and resources invested in
the process.
The problem is that the insured has a direct interest in
assuring that the limit of liability is available for settlement or
payment of judgment, while the insurer may seek to defend on
74.
75.
1995).
76.

In re the Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000).
1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS & DISPUTES § 4.19, at 217 (3d ed.

Id. § 4.20, at 218-19.
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the merits. It may be in the financial interest of a risk averse
insured to offer the entire limits even in a case of poor liability
rather than run the risk that a hard fought defense will deplete
the limits and block settlement later or leave an unsatisfied
judgment. On the other hand, it may be in the insurer's interest
to establish through a hard fought defense that "nuisance"
claims will not invoke any settlement offers from this insurance
company. Hence, a conflict is born.
While prudent insurance defense counsel have traditionally
kept the insured informed of settlement offers, they have not
provided information to the insured on costs of defense. Because
the insured now must evaluate risk of loss and risk of defense
costs, the situation is more complex, so it may be necessary that
defense counsel now provide the insured full information on the
costs of defense.
Furthermore, the insured, in attempting to control the costs,
may seek to exercise more direction and control over the
defense. The lower the limits of insurance available in relation
to the potential loss and costs of defense, the more risk the
insurer will take if it does not accede to the insured's demands
for direction and control. This is an area in which the insurer
may be exposed to risk of claims for bad faith or excess exposure.
Indeed, one actuary author believes that the conflicts raised and
the rights of the insured in the face of the conflicts increase the
chances that the insurer will have no limit on its liability for
losses or for expenses of defense and the chance that the
insurance defense counsel will be liable to the insured for
77
malpractice.
C. Reservation of Rights
Before discussing settlement offers under DWL policies, let
us consider problems arising in coverage disputes. Courts have
used different approaches to the duty owed the insured by the
insurer where the insurer believes that a claim for which the
insured demands indemnity and defense does not fall within the
policy coverage. Unless the claim on its face is clearly outside
the coverage, the insurer questioning coverage but exercising
prudence will provide the insured with a reservation of rights
and proceed with the defense.
However, there is variation in the duty courts place on the

77.

Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 450-51.
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insurer. 78 Some allow an insurer to refuse defense and still
preserve the right to later litigate the coverage issue after the
insured has conducted the defense. 79 This leaves the insured
bearing the costs of defense unless a court should ultimately
decide later that the insurer was responsible. Other courts
decide that, in the face of a coverage conflict, the insurer must
defend, but that neither insured nor insurer are foreclosed from
subsequently litigating the coverage issue.8 0 This leaves the
insurer bearing the costs of defense with little hope of recouping
the costs if the court ultimately decides no coverage existed. The
problem is that the insurer which undertakes the defense in the
face of a coverage dispute is ethically bound not to act in its
interest to the detriment of the insured by developing through
fact investigation or discovery the facts necessary to prove lack
of coverage.8 1 Consequently, a third line of decisions would
forbid the insurer in the coverage dispute from undertaking the
defense of the insured, but would require that the insurer pay
the costs of defense and provide the insured an independent
83
counsel.8 2 In California this procedure is statutory.
There is no conflict if the insurer elects to defend
unconditionally, without reservation of rights, since estoppel
4
will later prevent the insurer from withdrawing defense.
However, if the insurer defends under reservation of rights,
there is potential conflict, since the carrier may only be
concerned about the interim costs of defending while the insured
must worry about the ultimate cost and payment of loss. Where
the insurance policy contains DWL provisions, the insurer may
find itself giving notice of reservation of right to withdraw when
defense expenditures exceed the limits of liability. This raises
the question whether giving notice that a claim will not likely be
covered by the limits is any different than giving notice that a
claim might not be covered by the policy language.
If the insurer defends under reservation of right to
withdraw when the policy limit is exceeded, is it not defending
78. 1 WINDT, supra note 75, § 4.22, at 226. Windt notes "[tihere are six lines of
authority as to what the insurer can or must do when it has a duty to defend and there is
a conflict of interest between it and the insured regarding the conduct of the insured's
defense."
79. See, e.g., Burd v. Sussex Mutual Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 10-11 (N.J. 1970).
80. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177-78 (Cal. 1966).
81. See, e.g., Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (Ariz. 1976).
82. 1 WINDT, supra note 75, § 4.22, at 227-28 & n. 253.
83.

CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860 (West 1999).

84.

1 WINDT, supra note 75, § 4.20, at 219.
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under a conflict insofar as it may provide a token defense, or
provide a "win at any cost" (therefore exhausting the limits)
defense while failing to work for the lowest possible settlement?
How is this different from situations in which it is deemed best
to allow the insured to select independent counsel?
Windt asserts that issuance of a reservation of rights does
not necessarily mean that a conflict exists such that the carrier
will lose the right to select counsel. He states that a conflict
exists only if a coverage issue will later be determined by facts
in the lawsuit being defended and the outcome can be controlled
by defense counsel.8 5 But, he notes that a conflict can arise with
regard to the conduct of the insured's defense:
Specifically, a conflict over the existence of coverage will serve to
create a conflict of interest with regard to the insured's defense
when the insurer's potential liability could be reduced if the
86
insured were defended in a particular manner.

As an example, he cites the situation where plaintiff has
plead alternate theories of negligence and intentional conduct
and it would be in the insurer's interest and against the
insured's interest to develop facts showing that the conduct was
intentional.8 7 Such a conflict would require that the insured
88
select independent counsel.
Where counsel is defending under a DWL policy and where
cost of defense coupled with the potential loss payment likely
will exceed policy limits, a conflict may arise with regard to the
conduct of the insured's defense.
A vigorous defense by
insurance counsel may quickly deplete the policy limit and allow
the insurer to withdraw leaving the indemnity limit exhausted
and the insured exposed. There is no conflict under a standard
liability policy where the insurer has issued a reservation of
89
rights letter warning that the claim exceeds the policy limit.
Theoretically, defense counsel will not do anything in that
situation to adversely affect the insured's liability. However,
that changes when the defense costs are subtracted from the
indemnity limit.
Under DWL, defense counsel has substantial power to affect
the insured's ability to respond to settlement offers or verdicts.
Consequently, under conflict logic, the insurer should cede to the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
See, e.g., Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Co., 550 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. 1976).
1 WINDT, supra note 75, § 4.20, at 225.
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insured the right to select counsel unless the limit is so
substantial that there is no potential to exhaust it. The risk to
the carrier who "acts wrongfully in connection with satisfying its
duty to defend" is the potential for being "estopped from denying
coverage" beyond the limit. 90 For the insurer, this can be a
grave risk.
For example, in Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corporation,91
members of the board of directors of a failed savings and loan
institution brought action for declaratory judgment and bad
faith against the insurer for failing to pay defense costs and to
participate in settlement. The insurer had been paying legal
expenses of the directors as they became due in a civil action
brought by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") and the First Hawaiian Bank against the directors.
The FSLIC and bank were pressing shareholder direct and
derivative actions they obtained by assignment.
MGIC, the D & 0 insurer, insisted on defending under
reservation of rights on the apparent ground that some of the
claims against the directors were covered and some were not.
The policy provided that the insurer would pay "all Loss which
the Directors and Officers ...shall become legally obligated to
pay" and defined "Loss" to include "costs... and defense of legal
actions." 92 However, provision 5(a) of the policy provided: "No
costs, charges and expenses shall be incurred or settlements
made without the Insurer's consent which consent shall not be
unreasonably withheld; however, in the event such consent is
given, the Insurer shall pay, subject to the provisions of Clause
4, such costs, settlements, charges and expenses. '93 Provision
5(c) then gave the Insurer discretion to advance "expenses"
incurred by the directors but provided "always that in the event
it is finally established the Insurer has no liability hereunder,
such Directors and Officers agree to repay to the Insurer, upon
demand, all monies advanced by virtue of this provision." 94
For two years, MGIC paid the attorneys' fees as they
became due while reserving the right to contest coverage and to
demand repayment if it was later ruled that the claims were not
90. Id. § 4.22, at 231 (citing Shelby Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Ins. Co., 569 So. 2d 309, 312-13 (Ala. 1990) (for the "implication" that the
insurer will be automatically estopped from denying coverage)).
91. 823 F.2d 276, 277-79 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. Id. at 278.
93. Id. at 279.
94. Id.
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covered. After two years, some of the directors demanded
unconditional payment of defense costs asserting that the policy
was a liability policy and not an indemnity policy. MGIC
refused contending that its discretion in payment of "expenses"
under 5(c) meant that it had no duty to pay defense costs
contemporaneously with damages and could withhold them
pending ultimate determination of coverage under the
reservation of rights. The court held that the costs of the
"defense of legal actions" included in the definition of loss were
not clearly contained in the "expenses" which were subject to the
insurer's discretion in payment under provision 5(c).
Consequently, the court found the insured could have had a
reasonable belief that the policy provided contemporaneous
payment of defense costs and ruled that this was the insured's
right.
However, the court upheld the insurers' right to
repayment under the reservation of rights in the event of an
ultimate finding of no coverage. Further, the court said that
MGIC must apportion costs, since they had no duty to pay
defense costs on uncovered claims.
D. Control of the Defense
In a standard policy case, the insured who retains
independent counsel to undertake defense in a coverage dispute
may have little incentive to keep defense costs down other than
the possibility that the court will find no coverage later on. To
defend the claim, the insured may retain lawyer specialists
whose costs may be extremely high. Under a DWL policy, the
insured, proceeding in its own defense, has a direct interest in
keeping the attorneys' fees at a minimum and in controlling the
defense. If the insurer refuses to defend, the insured will
contend this is a bad faith breach. If the insurer defends, the
insured may fault the decision to defend instead of settling.
Many insurers offering D & 0 coverage avoid this problem by
selling policies that are not only DWL but contain no duty to
defend. These are indemnity-only policies under which the
insurer reimburses defense expenditures only after the insured
selects counsel, controls the defense, and submits the defense
bill.
E. Duty to Settle
Once the insurer has determined that there is coverage or
has undertaken defense outright or under reservation of rights,
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2001
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it is bound also by a duty to settle if settlement is in the
insured's interests. Standard language in the basic insuring
agreement in liability policies reserves to the insurer the
discretion to settle a claim. 95
Because the insurers have
reserved to themselves the right to settle, the courts have found
96
that they also have certain duties to settle.
In 1962 the Federal District Court in the District of
Montana, in Jessen v. O'Daniel,97 found one of the duties to be
"negotiating for a settlement where a fair and honest appraisal
of the case requires such action." In the 1958 landmark case,
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,98 the court said
protection by way of settlement was one of the benefits that
inured to the insured under a policy and that, as a matter of
good faith and fair dealing, the insured owed a duty to settle in
appropriate cases. The court in that case stated that in
determining whether to settle, the insurer must give the
95. For example, standard professional liability policies use this language: "The
company may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or SUIT as it deems
expedient." See, e.g., MILLER'S, supra note 3, Physicians, Surgeons and Dentists
Professional Liability Insurance (Claims Made) Form GL 00 22 03 81, form PLPS3,
provision 1C2 at 453.4; Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance (Claims Made) Form
GL 00 24 03 81, form PLLP3, provision 01C2, at 454.0 and Hospital Professional
Liability Insurance (Claims Made) Form GL 00 21 03 81, form PLHP2, provision 1B2, at
454.3.
The standard commercial coverage forms provide: "We may at our discretion investigate
any 'occurrence' and settle any claim or 'suit' that may result." See, e.g., Id., Commercial
General Liability Form CG 00 02 10 93, form CGGL2, provision lAlf, at 421.
The standard business auto policy forms provide: "We may investigate and settle any
claim or 'suit' as we consider appropriate." See, e.g., Id., Business Auto Coverage Form
CA 00 01 12 90, form CABAP, provision 2A4c, at 260; Garage Coverage Form CA 00 05
07 97, form CAGAP, provision 2A3c, at 271; and Truckers Coverage Form CA 00 12 07
97, form CATRP, provision 2A4c, at 286. The standard personal auto policy provides:
"We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these
damages." See, e.g., Id., PersonalAuto Policy Form PP 00 01 06 94, form PAP, provision
A1A3, at 2. The standard homeowner's policy provides: "We may investigate or settle any
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate." See, e.g., Id., Homeowners 3 Special Form
HO 00 03 04 91, form HO, provision 1.1 E6ia, at 204, and Farmers Comprehensive
PersonalLiability Form HO-73 (Ed. 4-80), form HOFAR, provision 2.1 Elb, at 248. Note
that professional liability coverage forms from 1973 provided for settlement only with
consent of the insured as follows: "... . and may make such investigation and, with the
written consent of the insured, such settlement of any claim or suit as it deems
expedient." See, e.g., Id., Physicians, Surgeons and Dentists Professional Liability
Insurance Form GL 00 11 01 73, Form PLPS1, provision 1B2, at 453.1, and Form GL 00
20 08 61, form PLLP1, provision A2a, at 453.6. These forms are out of use and have not
been offered insureds since the late 1980s.
96. See generally, ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, § 7.8(a)
(Practitioner's ed. 1988).
97. 210 F. Supp. 317, 319 (D. Mont. 1962).
98. 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (Cal. 1958).
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interests of the insured "at least as much consideration as it
does to its own interests;" and "[wihen there is great risk of a
recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable
manner of disposing to the claim is a settlement which can be
made within those limits, a consideration in good faith of the
insured's interest requires the insurer to settle the claim." 99 In
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, Connecticut,10 0
the court said the test to determine whether an insurer has
given consideration to the interests of the insured is "whether a
prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the
settlement offer."
If, in its discretion, the insurer chooses not to settle, and the
verdict falls within policy limits, the only real detriment to the
insurer will likely be the insurer's indemnification of the insured
by payment of the loss within the limit. If, on the other hand, a
verdict is returned in excess of the policy limits, the insurer is
exposed to risk of excess coverage by reason of bad faith failure
to settle. Factors to be considered in determining whether the
insurer should be liable for the excess by reason of bad faith
were set forth in Jessen v. O'Daniel:
Factors to be considered include (1) whether, by reason of the
severity of the plaintiffs injuries, any verdict is likely to be greatly
in excess of the policy limits; (2) whether the facts in the case
indicate that a defendant's verdict on the issue of liability is
doubtful; (3) whether the company has given due regard to the
recommendations of its trial counsel; (4) whether the insured has
been informed of all settlement demands and offers; (5) whether
the insured has demanded that the insurer settle within the policy
limits; (6) whether the company has given due consideration to
any offer of contribution made by the insured. 101

In Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corporation,10 2 the court
overturned a summary judgment for bad faith failure to enter
settlement negotiation granted the insured by the trial court.
While the insurer had spent $1 million in defense of the claims,
potentially exhausting the $1 million limit of the DWL policy,
there were disputed issues of fact with regard to whether MGIC
participated in settlement. The appellate court said the "breach
of a duty to settle in good faith depends on the reasonableness of
the insurer's conduct"'103 and reversed the summary judgment.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 201.
426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967).
Jessen, 210 F. Supp. at 326-27.
823 F.2d 276, 283 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id.
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Jessen v. O'Daniel and its progeny were decided without
regard to modern DWL policies. It would be consistent today for
a court to add as a factor for consideration whether failure to
settle will result in the indemnity limit being exhausted for
purposes of indemnifying against a verdict or for purposes of
later settlement negotiations. Hence, the duty to settle may
involve more factors and be more complex for the insurer
defending under a DWL policy.
F. Demand for Settlement Within the Policy Limits
Consider the problems raised when a plaintiff demands
settlement within policy limits on a DWL policy. Insurers take
demands for policy limits seriously, since their rejection is
10 4
considered tantamount to declaring the policy limitless.
The insurer's dilemma in DWL policies is knowing what
exactly constitutes a policy limit demand. It could be (1) an offer
to settle for the policy limit or less than the policy limit, (2) an
offer to settle for the balance of the policy limit after subtracting
defense costs to date, or (3) an offer to settle for the reasonable
amount that will be left after deduction of defense costs
reasonably likely to be expended.
For instance, suppose the insurer has issued a legal
malpractice policy with DWL provisions with a $100,000 limit of
liability coverage. The policy applies to cover a situation in
which the insured lawyer and the injured plaintiff shared equal
blame for failing to file a case within the statute of limitations.
Suppose also that plaintiffs underlying personal injury damages
were $100,000, and defense costs could reasonably be expected
to be $50,000.
Would the insurer have any duty to accept a demand for
settlement of $50,000? Would the insurer be liable for excess
verdict, if it spent $50,000 defending the claim and suffered a
verdict of $100,000 ($50,000 over the balance remaining on the
policy limit)? If the insurer's own evaluation of the case
reflected a belief that the loss value, assuming 50% comparative
negligence, was $50,000, and the costs of defense would exceed
$50,000, would it have an obligation to accept an offer of

104. While case law sets out "prudent insurer" tests in such cases as Crisci, 426
P.2d at 176, the strict liability suggestion of cases such as Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201,
leads insurance defense counsel commonly to advise their client insurers to consider
themselves strictly liable for excess coverage, if a verdict comes back in excess of the
limit within which they have rejected an offer.
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settlement of $100,000?
If an insurer that had no DWL
provisions in its policy turned down a $50,000 offer and suffered
a verdict in excess of the limit, it would surely be held liable for
the excess.
Given the pressure that can be exerted on settlement
negotiations by placing the insurer in a situation of potential
bad faith, it will only be matter of time before such issues
emerge as DWL provisions are litigated.
G. The Conflict for the Plaintiffs Attorney
DWL policies do not only present conflicts and problems for
insurance defense counsel; the plaintiffs attorney faced with a
tortfeasor insured under a DWL policy must also use care in
proceeding to recover against the insured. Many plaintiffs'
lawyers find an aggressive litigation approach to be an effective
method for inducing the defense to offer settlement. Some have
a policy of filing suit immediately and pursuing pretrial
discovery without negotiating until the defense feels compelled
to offer settlement or tender the limits of the available
insurance.
If the available insurance contains DWL provisions,
however, such tactics may not be in the best interest of the
claimant because every dollar plaintiffs counsel forces the
defense to spend is a dollar not available for settlement or
payment of the verdict. Plaintiffs counsel will have much more
incentive to make early attempts to negotiate settlement and to
negotiate agreements on limiting discovery, pretrial motions and
other matters that can waste the asset represented by the
indemnity limit.
This may prove to be an incentive for
cooperation, since the defense attorney also has a duty to limit
costs of defense for the protection of the insured.
If settlement attempts by plaintiffs counsel meet with
rejection or an aggressive stance by the defense, plaintiff faces
the prospect of fighting a battle that will reduce the limit below
that necessary for settlement or satisfaction of verdict. In such
a situation, plaintiff has every incentive to attempt to
manipulate the insurer into a position of having made a bad
faith decision by refusing to settle and engaging in expensive
defense. Plaintiff may have an ally in the insured especially if
the insured has independent counsel monitoring the decisions of
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the insurer. 105
H. Withdrawal of Defense on Exhaustion of Limits
Normally, if an insurer has undertaken defense of a claim
without a reservation of rights, withdrawal is out of the
question:
Where an insurer, without reservation and with actual or
presumed knowledge, assumes the exclusive control of the defense
of claims against the insured, it cannot thereafter withdraw and
deny liability under the policy on the ground of noncoverage,
prejudice to the insured by virtue of the insurer's assumption of
the defense being, in this situation, conclusively presumed ...the
loss of the right of the insured to control and manage the case is
106
itself prejudicial.

In Transamerica Insurance v. Chubb and Son, Inc.,107 the
court held that the insurer that defended for ten months was
estopped to deny coverage for three reasons. First, before
backing out of the case, the company had undertaken and
conducted the defense for ten months, thereby depriving the
insured "of their valuable right to retain private counsel." 108
Second, if the insured were not protected by the policy, they then
"had the right to arrange for the initial investigation, settlement
negotiations, and the conduct of the law suit [sic]."109 Third,
there was a potential conflict of interest on the part of the
retained defense attorney vis-a-vis the insured. 110
The basic insuring agreement in a DWL policy will
generally contain a provision allowing the insurer to withdraw
when the limit has been exhausted by claims expenses or loss
payment:
The company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment
or to defend or continue to defend any SUIT after the applicable
limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of

105. Consider the insurer's position if plaintiffs counsel writes the insurer or their
counsel a letter (1) reciting the facts of the conflict caused by the refusal to settle within
policy limits and the decision to expend considerable defense costs, (2) inviting the
insurer to give full notice of the conflict situation to the insured, and (3) asking the
insurer to have the insured's independent counsel contact the plaintiffs attorney so they
can explore ways of protecting the insured.
106. Safeco Ins. v. Ellinghouse, 725 P.2d 217, 221 (Mont. 1986) (quoting 14 LEE R.
Russ & THOMAs F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d, § 51.85 (2d ed. 1982).

107. 554 P.2d 1080 (Wash. 1976).
108. Id. at 1083. See also, Beckwith Machinery v. Travelers Indem., 638 F.Supp.
1179, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Safeco, 725 P.2d at 221.
109. Transamerica Ins., 554 P.2d at 1083.
110. Id.
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judgments, settlement or CLAIMS EXPENSES."'

1

However, even under a DWL policy, withdrawal may
Courts may estop insurers from
sometimes be thwarted.
withdrawing even when they have the policy rights to do so in
the following categories of cases: 112 (1) where the case is so near
trial as to prejudice the insured in its defense if the insurer
withdraws; (2) where the insurer, in the course of defending, has
done something that prejudices the insured in its defense, or (3)
where the insurer has already defended the insured over a
3
substantial period of time."
If the policy contains clear DWL provisions and a clear right
of the insurer to withdraw upon exhaustion of the limits by
expenses, categories (1) and (3) should not present problems of
prejudice, since counsel can continue defending and the only
change will be in who pays. However, if the insurer and the
insured have disagreed on defense versus settlement, the
insured will contend that the insurer has, in the course of
defending, prejudiced the case by exhausting the pool of money
left for settlement or verdict. While the insured could seek a
remedy for such a wrong after it had defended itself by bringing
an action for breach of contract for failure to settle, there is a
risk that a court would simply disallow the withdrawal.
Furthermore, if the insurer is held to have wrongfully
withdrawn, the majority rule is that the insured does not have
to defend itself and may settle the case without consent." 4 The
only duty of the insured at that point is to cooperate; the insured
115
need not minimize the insurer's exposure.
VI. ENFORCING DWL PROVISIONS

Several courts have grappled with issues of whether
particular insurance policies provide defense within limits.
While professional liability policies and D & 0 liability policies
have long contained express DWL provisions, the courts have
recently entertained disputes about whether certain CGL
policies provide defense within limits. Emergence of such issues
in the courts probably reflects the size and number of claims

111.
24 03 81,
112.
113.
114.
115.

MILLER'S, supra note 3, Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance Form GL 00
form PLLP3, provision 01C3, at 454.0.
1 WINDT, supra note 75, § 4.30, at 248.
See, e.g., Safeco, 725 P.2d at 221; Beckwith Machinery, 638 F. Supp. at 1186.
1 WINDT, supranote 75, § 4.18, at 214.
Id. at 215.
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that arose during the 1980s from the savings and loan collapse,
toxic torts and the concomitant magnitude of the costs of defense
involved in such cases. Simply put, the issue became who would
pay for the enormous costs of defense involved in those
phenomenal claims.
Not surprisingly, some carriers faced with historically
unprecedented and unpredicted losses and costs of defense,
attempted to read DWL provisions into standard CGL policies.
In Bankers Trust v. Imperial Casualty and Indemnity, 116
Bankers Trust won a tort judgment against Lee Kelling &
Associates (LKA) for $12.88 million. Imperial, which provided
primary commercial general liability coverage to LKA with $2
million limits, incurred more than $2 million in legal expense in
defending LKA in the underlying action. Imperial, apparently
staggered by the cost of defense, took the position that those
costs counted toward the $2 million limit of liability and sought
a court declaration that its coverage was exhausted. 117 The
federal district court disagreed and Imperial appealed.
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook succinctly stated the
predicament that prompted Imperial to insist that its CGL
policy provided DWL:
Under most policies, the costs of defense are nominally unlimited,
although the stakes of the case set an implicit limit: an insurer
will expend only a fraction of its total exposure, for the alternative
is to tender the policy limits in settlement. A primary insurer's
choice may be complicated, however, when there is excess
insurance, for the policies may interlock in a fashion that requires
the primary carrier to put on a defense that will inure to the
benefit of the excess carriers, or when state law requires an
insurer to go on defending even after paying the policy limits.
Apparently one or the other occurred in Bankers Trust's litigation
against LKA, for otherwise Imperial acted foolishly in paying
lawyers more than $2 million trying to ward off a judgment that
118
from Imperial's perspective could not exceed $2 million.

In fact, Imperial's policy appeared to be a standard CGL
policy with a standard basic insuring agreement and "limits of
liability" provision. However, the Declarations section of the
policy provided: "The limit of liability afforded under the Policy
shall be subject to the deductible amount (set forth below) which
shall be applicable to 'each claim' and shall be inclusive of 'costs,

116.
117.
118.

7 F.3d 93 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 94.
Id.
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charges and expenses."' 119 "Costs, charges and expenses" were
defined in the policy to exclude the company's adjustment
expenses, but to include such items as attorney fees, court costs
and expert expense. 120 The court found this to mean only that
legal fees in defense counted toward the deductible.
However, Imperial pointed to the fact that the definition of
"damages" included "costs, charges and expenses."' 2' The court
noted the obvious, "damages" was not a term in the limit of
liability but in the obligation to indemnify and meant only that
Imperial had to pay any costs, charges and expenses if they were
part of a judgment against their insured. The court refused to
construe the policy provisions as DWL.
The court found Imperial's reading of its policy to be less
than candid:
Imperial believes that its policy is among the minority that counts
defense expenditures toward the limit of liability. It did not tell
LKA or its other insured so in 1985, when it issued the policy;
indeed, Imperial's interpretation of its policy appears to be a
" 122
recent discovery.

Noting that federal courts had, in unpublished decisions,
ruled twice previously that Imperial's CGL policies were not
DWL, 23 Judge Easterbrook wrote, "we publish this decision and
119. Id. at 95.
120. Id. stating:
The words "costs, charges and expenses" shall mean: legal expenses, excluding
the cost of investigation and adjustment of claims by salaried employees of the
Company and fee adjusters, but including attorney's fees, arbitrator's fees,
court costs, expenses incurred in obtaining expert testimony and the
attendance of witnesses and costs incurred in connection with arbitration
proceedings against the Named Insured; provided only those items of expense
which can be directly allocated to a specific claim involving litigation or
possible litigation shall be included).
121. Id. stating:
The word "damages" shall mean: loss, judgments, settlements and "costs,
charges and expenses", provided always that such subject of damages shall not
include fines or penalties imposed by law or other matters which may be
deemed uninsurable under the law pursuant to which the Policy shall be
construed).
122. Id. at 94.
123. Id. See also Biomass One, LP v. Imperial Cas. & Indem., No. 91-35197, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 17773, at *1 (9th Cir. July 20, 1992) (reported as Table Case at 968
F.2d 1220, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 23129).; International Ins. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem.,
No. CV 91 5494 JGD, 1992 WL 547721 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1992), appeal docketed, No. 9256551 (9th Cir.). The author notes that Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that
dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential
and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel. This unpublished decision is cited here because its facts
and discussion aid in the DWL analysis.
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trust that Imperial will desist." 124 It is noteworthy that the
court did not award the insureds sanctions against Imperial
even though Imperial had lost the issues twice previously in the
unpublished decisions.
In Biomass One v. Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Co.,125
Biomass sued S-P Construction in a state court in Oregon.
Imperial defended under a professional liability insurance policy
and paid $1.9 million in defense costs while asserting that the
policy was DWL so that the limits were essentially exhausted.
S-P Construction settled with Biomass assigning its rights
against Imperial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later
reviewing the lower court's conclusion that the policy was DWL,
said, "No single sentence in the Imperial policy unambiguously
states that defense costs shall be counted in determining when
the policy limit is exhausted. Instead, the parties confront us
with competing interpretations of a variety of the policy's
provisions."1 26 The court implied that DWL provisions were
"provisions that serve to reduce or forfeit coverage" requiring
127
that the insured be given specific and unequivocal notice."
The Bankers Trust and Biomass cases against Imperial
Casualty and Indemnity make clear the twin propositions that
DWL cannot be read into the standard CGL policy and that the
insurer, being the drafter of the policy, is not in a position to
argue that a policy provides DWL by virtue of ambiguity.
In their promise to indemnify the insured for liability to
others, basic insuring agreements often define the loss for which
they will indemnify the insured to include such things as
attorney fees, court costs and interest on any judgment or
award. Such definitions of loss or damage payable on behalf of
the insured have provided an opportunity for insurers to claim
that the language is meant to provide for DWL. However, the
courts have only recognized the provisions as promises to
indemnify if the insured has to pay attorney fees, court costs and
interest to another party by reason of the insured's liability to
that party, and have ruled that the express provisions admit no
interpretation that costs of defense are included in the limit of
liability for loss payable.
This was the case in Planet Insurance Co. v. Mead

124.
125.
126.
127.

7 F.3d 93, 95 (7th Cir. 1993).
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17773, at *1.
Id.
Id.
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Reinsurance Corporation,128 where the insurer promised to
indemnify for "Ultimate Net Loss" which was defined in the
policy to include "(1) the sum paid... in satisfaction of the
losses ... (2) and includes attorney's fees, court costs and
interest on any judgment or award, (3) but excludes all loss
adjustment expenses and all salaries of employees and office
expenses of the insured ..
"."129
The court refused the insurer's
entreaties that the provision be construed to include defense
costs, noting that the provision could be made consistent by
construing it to mean that the insurer "is liable to the insured
for Ultimate Net Loss in the same amount that the insured
becomes liable to the plaintiff.'' 3 0 In other words, if the insured
has to pay a judgment including attorney fees, they are covered,
but such is not the case with the insurer's costs of defending.
In Grunewald & Adams Jewelers, Inc. v. Lloyds of
London,13 1 the policy provided for a $1,500 deductible that
included "costs and expenses incurred.., by or on behalf of the
Assured."132 It further provided that the aggregate liability
"(including costs and expenses as aforesaid)" could not exceed
$25,000.133 Lloyds contended the provisions gave them the right
to deduct from the $25,000 liability limit $12,000 in attorney
fees spent defending the action which would leave only $13,000
for payment of the $25,000 settlement demand. While the lower
court agreed with Lloyds, the appellate court reversed and ruled
that costs of defense were included only in the deductible and
not in the definition of aggregate liability. 34 The court quoted
with approval, language from the 1907 case of New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. CumberlandTelephone & Telegraph Co.: 135
If the Casualty Company should set [sic] fit to resist the claim, it
could make any defense it pleased, hire such and as many lawyers
as it wanted, and prolong the litigation to the last extremity. If its
liability for the accident were converted into a fund for carrying on
the contest, it could be done without the ordinary risks of
litigation, and the only prospect for the assured would be in the

remnant, if there should be any.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
App. 3d

A contract ought not to be

789 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
700 P.2d 888 (Ariz. 1985).
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id. at 891.
152 F. 961, 963 (6th Cir. 1907) quoted in Hertzka & Knowles v. Salter, 6 Cal.
325, 335 (1970).
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construed to an absurd conclusion, if a reasonable one is
136
possible.

In rendering the opinion, the Grunewald Court said:
To permit Lloyds' interpretation of the provision in question would
allow the possible depletion of all available coverage for damages
to the insured's prejudice.
We cannot envision such an
arrangement as being within the contemplation of the assured
137
under the policy.

Ambiguity may prevent the court from enforcing a DWL
provision. In Branning v. CNA Insurance Companies,138 CNA
sought to have the court interpret its D & 0 liability policy as
providing DWL. CNA's $3 million liability limit had been met or
exceeded by $3 million in defense costs.
The policy was
somewhat similar in construction to the appraiser's Errors and
Omissions policy in Grunewald. The "Limits of Liability" clause
provided: "The insurer shall be liable to pay one hundred
percent (100%) of any Loss (including costs, charges and
expenses as referred to in Clause 5) in excess of the
retention ."..",139
It also said the limit of liability "shall be the
maximum aggregate liability of the Insurer with respect to
140
claims made in each Policy Year."'
However, the policy defined "Loss" in terms of the amounts
the directors and officers were obligated to pay, but added the
language "and shall include but not be limited to damages,
judgments, settlements, costs (exclusive of salaries of officers or
employees),and defense of legal actions, claims or proceedings
and appeals therefrom ....-141 The issue was whether the
policy provided for DWL or whether it was ambiguous.
The court found that the juxtaposition of three different
clauses on three different pages along with the use of the
separate terms "loss" and "claims" would allow a reasonable
interpretation that the policy would pay $3 million in claims and
defense costs on top of that. Consequently, it was sent back to
the trial court for determination of the intent of the contracting
parties.
The court noted that CNA had, on the same day, issued an
IRA policy and a Keough policy to the Home Savings and Loan

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Grunewald, 700 P.2d at 890.
Id. at 891.
729 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id. at 731.
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Association which indicated in clear language on the first page
that the limit of liability was inclusive of defense costs, and
expressly so provided in the limit of liability clause.
In
comparing, the court concluded, with regard to the policy in
issue "that a purchaser of insurance could reasonably review
this policy and not be aware that the insurer sought to deduct
defense costs from the limit of liability." 142 Consequently, the
court did not allow the reduction of the limit for defense costs.
On the other hand, a court will enforce an insurance policy
that expressly provides for DWL. In Helfand v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co.,' 43 defrauded investors of Technical Equities
Corporation, a securities brokerage, brought a declaratory action
to determine the scope of coverage under D & 0 policies issued
to the financially collapsed and bankrupt firm. One of the issues
was whether the policy was a "wasting asset" so that the defense
costs would be included in (deducted from) the $10 million
annual indemnity limit.
The trial court ruled that defense costs were not included in
the indemnity limit, reasoning that the policy was ambiguous
"such that a normal insured would not be aware of its 'selfconsuming' nature" and construing it as a DWL policy would
defeat the reasonable expectations of the insureds as a matter of
law.144
The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the policy was
not ambiguous and was "self-consuming" in nature. 45 The court
noted that the policy definition of "loss" included defense costs
which were payable against the limits of liability just like any
other element of "loss." The policy contained a caption to an
endorsement that said "COSTS, CHARGES AND EXPENSES
AND DEFENSE INCLUDED IN LIMIT OF LIABILITY." 146 The
endorsement stated that when payment not exceeding "the
Limit of Liability has to be made to dispose of a claim, costs,
charges, expenses and settlements shall be payable up to the
Limit of Liability." 47 On that basis, the court rejected the trial
court's application of the reasonable expectations doctrine
stating "the doctrine of reasonable expectation of coverage comes

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
13
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 733.
Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
at 298.
at 299.
at 300.
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into play only where there is an ambiguity in the policy.' 148
149
Cal
In Coleman Co. v. California Union Insurance Co.,
Union was an excess insurer providing $1.5 million "followingform" 50 coverage in excess of primary coverage of $1 million by
Commercial Union and a retention by Coleman of $1.5 million.
The primary coverage with Commercial Union unambiguously
contained DWL provisions' 5' so that its limits could be
exhausted by defense costs. Cal Union had agreed it would
follow as excess behind primary insurance that was "standard
1 52
CGL/Products form."
The underlying DWL policy was sent to Cal Union which
added an "Endorsement No. 10" providing that the excess
coverage would follow the underlying coverage but that "an
obligation to defend was not within the excess policy's
coverage." 153 Hence, there was no issue of whether the excess
policy provided DWL. However, Cal Union promised to insure
"in excess of the retained limit hereinafter stated which
[Coleman] shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages .... "154
The issue, then, was whether the defense costs, which were
included in the liability limit of the underlying policy, were "also
included in calculating the attachment point of the umbrella
policy."'155 Cal Union's position was that defense costs could be
used to exhaust the underlying DWL policy limit but could not
be used to calculate the point of attachment at which the excess
coverage would kick in. The court noted that Cal Union's
obligations were triggered when the "retained limit" was
exceeded and that "retained limit" was defined only as the
Lacking any
scheduled limit of the underlying insurance.
further definition, and swayed by the fact that the endorsement
providing the excess coverage said it "shall follow and be subject
156
to the same terms and conditions of the underlying policy,"
148. Id. at 302 (quoting Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Vaughn, 199 Cal. App. 3d
171,179 (1988).
149. 960 F.2d 1529, 1531 (10th Cir. 1992).
150. A "following-form" policy provides coverage in the same form as the underlying
or primary coverage.
151. Id., 960 F.2d at 1533.
152. Id. at 1531. A "standard form" CGL or comprehensive general liability policy
refers to the forms put out by the I.S.O. and would not include DWL provisions.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1533.
155. Id. at 1530.
156. Id. at 1536.
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the court held that the excess carrier must look to the
underlying policy which included defense costs in the limit of
liability. Consequently, the court affirmed summary judgment
on behalf of Coleman, finding Cal Union's coverage was
triggered when the limits of the underlying policy were
57
exhausted by defense costs. 1

VI.STATUTORY LAW ON DEFENSE WITHIN LIMITS

Some states have enacted statutes regulating or prohibiting
DWL provisions in insurance policies. Minnesota prohibits
liability policies that reduce the limits of liability by the costs of
However, the statute exempts from its
legal defense. 158
application, professional liability policies with liability limits
greater than $100,000, environmental impairment insurance,
insurance of large commercial risks (defined as those businesses
with gross annual revenues of at least $10,000,000), and other
coverages which the commissioner deems appropriate. 159 The
exemption of professional liability policies with liability limits of
more than $100,000 makes the statute essentially moot for
application to most professional liability policies and means that
DWL is actually allowed for those policies in Minnesota.
New York permits insurers to offer defense within limits
60
liability coverage for directors' and officers' liability coverage'
and for "Class 2 risks," those being "Large Commercial
Insureds." 161 The logic is that those insureds are sophisticated
buyers who have the power to negotiate as they see fit and are
often under manuscript policies in any event.
Montana prohibits any provision in a casualty insurance
form "permitting defense costs within limits, except as
157. The underlying summary judgment granted Coleman by the United States
District Court in Kansas is Coleman Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 1990 WL 146513
(D. Kan. 1990).
158.

MINN. STAT. § 60A.08 (13) (1998).

159. Id.
160. N.Y. COMP.CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 107 (1992).
161. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 16.12 (1999) defines large commercial
insureds as those (a) Policies providing liability coverage for directors and officers of
corporations which: (1) have a net worth of at least $15,000,000, or (2) have gross assets
exceeding $50,000,000 and a net worth of at least $3,000,000; or (3) is a for-profit
business entity that generates annual gross revenues exceeding $50,000,000, and has a
net worth of at least $3,000,000; or (4) is a for-profit business entity that has gross assets
exceeding $50,000,000 and generates annual gross revenues exceeding $50,000,000; or
(5) is a not-for-profit organization or public entity with an annual budget exceeding
$50,000,000 for each of its three fiscal years immediately preceding the policy's effective
date; or (b) Policies containing primary liability limits of at least $5,000,000.
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permitted by the commissioner in his discretion." 162 The statute
provides no guidance to aid the commissioner's exercise of
discretion.
Arkansas forbids defense within limits provisions in
automobile liability insurance policies, but purports to allow
defense within limits policy provisions in other liability policies,
so long as the policy provides a separate limit for defense costs
equal to the liability limit. 163 In effect, this means Arkansas
does not allow defense within limits in any policy, but does allow
a limit on defense costs in liability policies other than auto. The
statute appears to grant the commissioner discretion to allow
DWL provisions if forbidding them is against the interest of
164
public protection.
In Oregon, if the cost of defending the claim is included in
the limits of liability, the policy may not be issued unless the
form has been approved by the director of the regulating
agency. 165
The director considers the "circumstances and
insurance needs of the proposed insureds." 66 The statute
requires the form include notice that the costs of defense are
included in the policy limits. 6 7 The statute applies to all
liability insurance policies. 168
The Commissioner in Colorado may prohibit a claims-made
policy that does not cover legal defense costs or includes them in
the claims-made policy aggregate. 69
In exercising that
162. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-502(2) (1999).
163. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-307(5)(A) (Michie 1999).
164. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-307(5)(B). This subsection shall not apply to policies
or contracts which the commissioner may exempt by order upon a finding that this
subsection may not practically be applied or that its application is not necessary or
desirable for the protection of the public.
165. OR. REV. STAT. § 742.063(1) (1999) provides as follows:
A liability insurance form that provides that the cost of defending a claim is
included within the stated limits of liability may not be delivered or issued for
delivery in this state until the form has been filed with and approved by the
Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services.
In
determining whether to approve or disapprove a form filed under this section,
the director shall consider, in addition to the factors specified in ORS 742.005,
the circumstances and insurance needs of the proposed insureds.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-419(3)(a) (West 1999) provides:
The commissioner may prohibit the use of a claims-made liability policy if the
policy does not contain one or more of the following policy provisions: (I) A
policy provision that legal defense costs are covered by the policy but that legal
defense costs are excluded from the claims-made policy aggregate ....
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discretion under the statute, the commissioner must "recognize
and balance the public interests in availability of insurance and
adequate coverage at reasonable rates." 170 Colorado's statute
applies only to claims-made policies.
We can observe that what little regulation of DWL
provisions exists in state statutes consists of prohibiting DWL
outright only on certain types of insurance, i.e., auto insurance
or low limit policies, and allowing the commissioner discretion in
liability,
i.e.,
professional
coverages,
risk
the high
environmental, and large commercial risk. Only one state,
Oregon, requires that the policy contain any particular notice
171
provisions.
On the other hand, Louisiana, which has no statute
prohibiting DWL provisions, judicially recognizes a public policy
against such provisions. 172 Exceptions to that public policy occur
73
in Louisiana in regulations of the Department of Insurance.
One can conclude there is little statutory regulation of DWL and
that the statutes have little effect. Indeed, one observer noted
that when the industry offered only DWL policies in 1987, the
commissioners all consented in their discretion under the
74
statutes.1
VIII. SOLUTIONS
There exist several approaches to dealing with the conflicts
in the DWL policies. It is good to examine each for benefits and
detriments. Consider the following:
A. Legislatively ForbidDWL Provisions in Policies
If DWL provisions were inherently bad as a matter of public
policy or inherently anti-consumer, their legislative prohibition
might make sense. However, such is not the case, and the
consumer detriment can be remedied by other less drastic
means that still allow DWL policies to add flexibility to the
casualty insurance market. It appears that DWL policies have
their place in high risk coverages such as large commercial
insureds, professional liability, and environmental liability.
170. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-419(3)(b).
171. OR. REV. STAT. § 742.063(2) (1999).
172. Edwards v. Daugherty, 776 So. 2d 557, 563 (La. 2000).
173. Id. at 562-563.
174. Telephone Interview with Robert Minto, President of Attorneys Liability
Protection Society (ALPS) (Apr. 12, 2001).
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Consequently, even in those states that purport to limit or
prohibit DWL by statute, the high risk coverages are exempted
or the commissioner is left with discretion to allow the
provisions. This may reflect the necessity of DWL provisions in
assuring enough predictability in higher risk insureds to make
the insurance available. There is nothing inherently bad about
DWL if the is fair and not the subject of misrepresentation.
B. Simply Allow a "Limitsof Defense" Provision
The industry's stated concern has been the unpredictability
of costs of defense. 175 It may be that the industry is simply
unwilling to bear defense costs which rival the enormous limits
of liability that enterprises now wish to purchase. At any rate,
one solution to the unpredictability is to allow a "limits of
defense" provision that parallels the standard "limits of liability"
provision. The natural corollary would be to include the limit of
defense on the declarations page of the policy where it would
readily acquaint the insured with the information necessary to
evaluate coverage and to compare coverage in relation to
premiums.
The parallel limits of defense provision would leave the
indemnity limit intact and avoid the ever present conflict
involved when defense expenditures can exhaust the indemnity
limit. However, if experience is any indicator, the insurers are
likely to choose limits for defense expenditures far lower than
their limits of liability. For example, the professional liability
insurers who provide defense expenses outside the liability limit
or as a threshold before being deducted from the liability limits
have so far chosen to do so in amounts that are only a fraction of
the limit. 176 This brings up a different problem. Can the carrier
withdraw from defense when its defense limit is exhausted, even
though its indemnity limit is intact? Would the insured prefer
the carrier continue defense under DWL at that point. Some
177
carriers do that exactly.
Adopting a limits at defense provision is a straightforward
option that makes clear the point at which risk of defense

175. But cf. Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 447. Rosenberg, an actuary for the New
Jersey Department of Insurance asserts that actuarial rate making procedures have
been developed over the past twenty years to make standard policies profitable without
DWL.
176. See discussion infra part III.
177. See ABA chart for 2001, supra note 21.
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expenses transfers to the insured.
It removes the
defense/settlement conflict and the issue of who should control
defense. It is a good option that would be fair to the insurance
consumer while meeting the need for predictability for the
insurer.
C. Require Disclosureof DWL on Policy
Because of consumer familiarity with the standard policy
and limit of liability provisions it is realistic to say that DWL
provisions embedded in a policy with no disclosure may often be
in derogation of the consumer's reasonable expectations. Oregon
requires disclosure of DWL provisions 178 and such disclosure in
the policy or on the declarations page would correct the
expectation that the policy is standard and would lessen the
chance that the policy would be determined to be ambiguous by
reason of its construction and layout. However, disclosure alone
would do nothing to remedy the conflicts inherent in DWL or the
disputes about control of the defense, notice of exhaustion and
withdrawal of the insurer from the case.
D. Approve a DWL Provision Which Limits the Defense Costs
that Apply to Reduce the Limit of Liability
There are several possible ways to do this of which I will
mention two. First, cap the amount of defense costs that can be
subtracted from the available indemnity limit, 179 i.e., only those
costs in excess of $25,000180 or only the first $25,000 of costs.
Second, set a minimum amount of the original liability limit
which must remain available for payment of loss and from which
8
defense costs may not be subtracted.' '
E. Make The DWL Policies Indemnity Policies Which Contain
No Obligationto Defend on The Partof the Insurer
In essence, this is already done in the D & 0 policies. Costs
of defense would be subtracted from the limit of liability, but the
insured would defend and seek reimbursement. The insured
would exercise much greater control over the allocation of the
indemnity limit to settlement or defense expense freeing the
178.
179.
180.
181.

OR. REV. STAT. § 742.063 (1999).
Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 462.
Id. at 449, n.8.
Id. at 462.
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insurer from risk of conflict. However, this may leave insureds
bearing at least an interim financial burden for defense until
reimbursement.
Also, insurance consumers
excluding
commercial insureds, will not want the responsibility of
managing the defense.
For example, issues of priority of
payment of loss versus defense expense will also exist with this
option.
Another option is to allow the insured complete control
whenever any potential conflict arises between the insurer and
the insured, i.e., anytime the claim plus predicted costs of
defense exceed the policy limit. The problem with this option is
the insured may make an unreasonable settlement because of
risk aversion. Also, the option deprives the insurer of the right
to select counsel and decide matters of settlement and defense in
82
many situations where removing that right is uncalled for.1
IX. CONCLUSION

The use of DWL provisions in casualty policies resulted in a
very significant change in coverage for insureds. While, under
standard policies their premiums bought a limit of indemnity
plus an unlimited promise to defend, their premiums now
purchase policies whose limit of indemnity is reduced by any
effort to defend.
If DWL was adopted to contain the
unpredictability of defense costs in the face of increasing
complexity of litigation, one cannot help but think it was
unnecessary. Simple adoption of a "limits of defense" provision
similar to a limit of liability with disclosure on the declarations
page would have promoted certainty.
The problem with adoption of the DWL provisions is that
they engender conflicts which did not exist in the standard form
policies. DWL provisions produce conflicts between the insured
and insurer that heighten the risk of bad faith or excess
coverage claims against the insurer. They also increase the
number of situations in which courts may rule that the insurer
has a policy which is limitless for defense and for indemnity. It
may still be a fact, however, that the financial benefit to the
insurers will outweigh the detriment of any potential bad faith
or excess claims suits.
182.
1 Windt, supra note 75, § 4.20, at 220. Windt asserts that the insurer should be
deprived of control only where the conflict allows the insurer to control the outcome of a
coverage issue, since, otherwise, the insured can seek remedy by action for breach of
contract.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/4

42

2001

DEFENSE WITHIN LIMITS

Munro: The Conflicts of "Wasting" or "Cannibalizing" Insurance Policies

In the present market, DWL provisions remain a feature of
insurance policies in the high risk areas of professional
malpractice, directors' and officers' liability, environmental
liability and liability of large commercial enterprises. If they are
necessary to making insurance affordable in those areas,
regulators should require their disclosure, so consumers are
fully informed and not mislead into believing that have
purchased the full limit of liability for indemnity against loss. It
is too late to make insureds aware of the huge risk which was
transferred to their shoulders when the insurance industry
included DWL provisions in policies while adopting claims-made
coverage.
As this article goes to press, it appears the market for
professional liability insurance is hardening, and reinsurers are
demanding primary insurers adopt DWL across the board.18 3 If
that assessment holds true, the issues raised here will appear
and be litigated in the courts. Reducing indemnity limits by
defense cots will not be without limits.

183.

Minto, supra note 174.
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